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Abstract — We describe how to achieve optimal entangle-
ment generation and one-way entanglement distillation rates
by coherent implementation of a class of secret key generation
and secret key distillation protocols, respectively.
Quantum information theory may be understood in
terms of inter-conversion between various resources [9].
One very desirable resource is a maximally entangled
state shared between two parties (Alice and Bob). It
allows them to perform various tasks such as teleporta-
tion, super-dense coding, etc. [5]. Another is a pair of
maximally correlated classical bit-strings shared by the
two parties, reliably secret from any third party (Eve). It
has important cryptographic applications since it can be
used as a secret key (or “one time pad”) allowing Alice
and Bob private communication over a public channel.
Although used for different purposes, the two resources
are intimately related through the property of “exclu-
siveness” — in the one case toward the total outside
world, in the other toward the eavesdropper Eve. This
connection has been confirmed by a growing literature
of useful analogies [7, 19] and operational equivalences
[1, 21]. In this Letter we further exploit this connection
to relate several private and quantum protocols, culmi-
nating in the demonstration of the “hashing inequality”
for one-way entanglement distillation [6, 13]. We con-
sider four distinct resource conversion scenarios, starting
from a noisy quantum channel/entanglement and ending
up with near-perfect secret key/entanglement. In other
words we are converting a noisy dynamic/static quantum
resource into a noiseless static private/quantum resource.
1. static → private = Secret key distillation. The task
is to convert n copies of the bipartite state ρAB shared
between Alice and Bob into nR bits of secret key using
1-LOPC (local quantum operations and forward public
communication). The quantity R is referred to as the
rate of the protocol. To understand what is meant by
a secret key, consider a purification ψABE = |ψ〉〈ψ|ABE
of ρAB and allow for the worst case scenario in which
the eavesdropper Eve is given the purifying system E.
Defining Φ = 12 (|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|), a pair of maximally
correlated bits written formally as a density operator, the
desired shared secret key is represented as (Φ
AB
)
⊗nR ⊗
θE ; the classical key shared between Alice and Bob is
decoupled from Eve’s state θ.
2. static → quantum = Entanglement distillation. Here,
by 1-LOCC (local quantum operations and forward clas-
sical communication) (ρAB)⊗n is to be converted into nR
bits of entanglement Φ⊗nR+ , where |Φ+〉 = 1√2 (|00〉+|11〉).
Since the final state is pure, the decoupling from E is
implicit. Including E in the description, the effect of the
protocol may be written as (ψABE)
⊗n
=⇒ (ΦAB+ )⊗nR ⊗
θE , which is just a coherent version of its private coun-
terpart above!
3. dynamic → private = Secret key generation. Here the
starting point is a noisy quantum channel N , a cptp map
taking density operators in the Hilbert space of Alice’s
system A′ to that of Bob’s B. Applying N is equiva-
lent to an isometric mapping onto a larger Hilbert space
corresponding to BE, which includes the environment E
assumed at Eve’s disposal. The channel may be charac-
terized by its effect on some bipartite pure state |ψ′〉AA′ ,
living entirely on Alice’s side, which now becomes the
mixed state ρAB = (1A ⊗N )ψ′ shared between her and
Bob. Note that the purifying system for ρAB is precisely
E, so that we again have the tripartite state ψABE . The
task is, by Alice choosing an appropriate input to N⊗n
and Bob performing a decoding operation, to generate
nR bits of secret key, decoupled from E as in the first
scenario.
4. dynamic → quantum = Entanglement generation.
The channel N is now used to generate nR bits of en-
tanglement. Again one may explicitly include E to stress
the resemblance to the private scenario.
We shall show how a particular asymptotic rate R de-
fined in terms of the state ψABE may be achieved for
the four scenarios, by which we mean that for sufficiently
large n there exists a protocol whose output approxi-
mates the desired state arbitrarily closely (in trace dis-
tance). First we give a simple dimension counting ar-
gument for secret key generation, and show how to aug-
ment it to work for secret key distillation. Then we mod-
ify the two protocols to make them “coherent”, yielding
the entanglement generation and distillation protocols,
respectively. Finally, we point to a more direct connec-
tion between the two coherent protocols and discuss the
implications of our results for finding optimal rates. A
rigorous treatment of the dynamic and static scenarios
via random code selection may be found in [8] and [10],
respectively, building on results from classical informa-
tion theory [2].
The state ψABE , related to our coherent protocols,
may be written in the Schmidt representation with re-
2spect to the A|BE partition as
|ψ〉ABE =
∑
x
√
P (x)|x〉A ⊗ |φx〉BE .
In the dynamic scenario it comes about by sending some
|ψ〉AA′ = ∑x
√
P (x)|x〉A ⊗ |φ′x〉A
′
through the channel.
Relevant to our private protocols is the “decohered” state
ψ
ABE
=
∑
x
P (x)|x〉〈x|A ⊗ φBEx , (1)
obtainable from |ψ〉ABE by measurement in the {|x〉}
basis. It represents the state of a cqq system XBE [9],
X being a random variable with probability distribution
P (x). In the dynamic scenario it arises from sending the
ensemble {P (x), |φ′x〉A
′} through the channel.
Define ω = ψ
B
= ψB and σ = ψ
E
= ψE . For a
quantum state ρ we denote the von Neumann entropy
H(ρ) = −Trρ log ρ, and the Shannon entropy of a ran-
dom variable X , H(X) = −∑x P (x) logP (x). If the
state is the reduced state of a multi–party state, like the
ψ
ABE
above, we write H(A) = H(ψ
A
), etc. In the par-
ticular case of (1), obviously H(ψ
A
) = H(X). For a
general bipartite state on AB define the conditional en-
tropy H(A|B) = H(AB) − H(B) and quantum mutual
information
I(A;B) = H(A) +H(B)−H(AB).
The latter for the cqq state in (1) is easily checked to be
equal to the Holevo information H(ω)−∑x P (x)H(φBx )
[11] for which we shall use the notation I(X ;B). As
a rule, information theoretical quantities involving X
are implicitly referring to ψ
ABE
, and those involving
A to ψABE . For instance, the coherent information
Ic(A〉B) = −H(A|B) [18] refers to ψABE , but may be
written as H(B) −H(E) = I(X ;B)− I(X ;E) when re-
ferring to ψ
ABE
. The protocols we are about to describe
will all achieve the rate R = Ic(A〉B). In the entangle-
ment distillation scenario this is known as the “hashing
inequality” [6, 13].
Typicality. Let us review the properties of typical se-
quences and subspaces. For the random variable X , any
ǫ, δ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists a typical set
T nX,δ consisting of sequences x
n = x1x2 . . . xn of length n
such that
2n[H(X)−δ] ≤ |T nX,δ| ≤ 2n[H(X)+δ],
and Pr{Xn ∈ T nX,δ} ≥ 1 − ǫ. Typical sequences are
those in which the fraction of a given letter x is approxi-
mated by its probability P (x), and the law of large num-
bers guarantees that such sequences will occur with high
probability. In less formal notation, large n will be im-
plicit, the typical set denoted by TX , H(X) ± δ written
as H(X)± and 1− ǫ as ≈ 1.
The quantum analogue of the typical set is the typical
subspace [17] TB of the Hilbert space H⊗nB , defined for
the quantum system B in the state ω. It satisfies
2nH(B)
− ≤ dim TB ≤ 2nH(B)+ ,
and ω⊗n is approximately supported on TB in the sense
that ΠBω
⊗nΠB ≈ ω⊗n (in trace distance) with ΠB the
projector onto TB .
For a cq systemXB and a particular sequence xn ∈ TX
there exists a conditionally typical subspace TB|X(xn) on
which φBxn =
⊗
i φ
B
xi is approximately supported, such
that
2nH(B|X)
− ≤ dim TB|X(xn) ≤ 2nH(B|X)
+
.
Another important fact is that the TB|X(xn) can be
thought of as being approximately contained in TB in the
sense that ΠBΠB|X(xn)ΠB enjoys the same asymptotic
properties as ΠB|X(xn).
HSW codes. An HSW [12] code C associated with the
Alice-Bob cq system XB is a subset of TX such that
the states (ψBxn)xn∈C can be distinguished with proba-
bility ≈ 1. Intuitively, the ψBxn , supported on the re-
spective TB|X(xn) of dimension at most 2nH(B|X)+ , can
be “packed” into TB of dimension at least 2nH(B)− with
negligible overlap if we take |C| = 2nI(X;B)− (Fig. 1).
The HSW theorem [12] confirms this geometric picture.
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FIG. 1: An HSW code. The arrows represent the map xn 7→
φBxn .
Privacy amplification sets. Privacy amplification
(PA) sets are, in a sense, dual to HSW codes. A pri-
vacy amplification set S, associated with the Alice-Eve
cq system XE, is a subset of TX of size S such that
1
S
∑
xn∈S
φExn ≈ σ⊗n. (2)
Evidently S = TX is a valid PA set, but we are interested
in making S as small as possible. Since σ⊗n and φExn
are “almost” uniformly supported on TE and TE|X(xn),
respectively, satisfying (2) amounts to “covering” TE , of
3dimension at most 2nH(E)
+
with the TE|X(xn), xn ∈ S,
each of which has dimension at least 2nH(E|X)
−
(Fig.
2). It can be shown (using techniques from [3]) that
the quotient of these dimensions, S = 2nI(X;E)
+
, indeed
suffices.
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FIG. 2: A privacy amplification set. The arrows represent the
map xn 7→ φExn .
Key generation (3.). We have seen that randomizing
over the members of the PA set leaves Eve with a state
essentially independent of the choice of S. The key gen-
eration strategy is now clear. Construct an HSW code
(ums)m,s, m = 1, . . .M , M = 2
nR− , s = 1, . . . S, of size
MS = 2nI(X;B)
−
such that each Sm = (ums)s is a PA
set. The key generation code is such a partitioned HSW
code (Fig. 3). Alice sends the ensemble { 1M , 1S
∑
s φ
′
ums}
through the channel, resulting in the cq state
Ψ
ABE
=
1
M
∑
m
|m〉〈m|A ⊗ 1
S
∑
s
φBEums .
Bob measures his system to find out m and Eve is left
with the state θE ≈ σ⊗n independent of the index m.
Key distillation (1.). The geometric idea (Fig. 3) is
to cover the space TX of dimension at most 2
nH(X)+ with
L = 2nH(X|B)
+
key generation codes Cl = (ulms)m,s of
size at least 2nI(X;B)
−
. Alice converts ψABE into ψ
ABE
for all n copies by measurement in the {|x〉} basis. The
measurement outcome xn with probability ≈ 1 lies in
TX . Due to the covering, x
n lies in some key generation
code labeled by l. Alice sends the “which key genera-
tion code” information l (this requires nI(X |B)+ bits),
leaves the overall system in the state Ψ
ABE
[16] and Bob
simply proceeds as in key generation. The extra classical
communication thus compensates for the initial resource
being static rather than dynamic.
We now show how the two private protocols can be
made coherent.
Entanglement generation (4.). For entanglement gen-
eration Alice prepares 1√
M
∑
m |m〉A⊗|ϕm〉A
′
, the quan-
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FIG. 3: A secret key generation code (left) viewed as a build-
ing block for a key distillation code (right).
tum code (|ϕm〉)m being defined by
|ϕm〉 = 1√
S
∑
s
|φ′ums〉. (3)
Upon applying the channel this becomes
|Ψ〉ABE = 1√
M
∑
m
|m〉A ⊗ 1√
S
∑
s
|φums〉BE . (4)
The remainder of the protocol consists of Bob decoding
operation. He performs the measurement of ms coher-
ently by appending a register B′ in a standard state |0〉,
performing a unitary operation that places the measure-
ment “outcome” ms into B′ and swapping the contents
of B and B′. Since the original measurement yielded the
correct value of ms with probability ≈ 1, the coherent
measurement can be constructed to output an approxi-
mation of
1√
MS
∑
ms
|m〉A ⊗ |ms〉B|φums〉B
′E
. (5)
This can be rewritten as
1√
M
∑
m
|m〉A ⊗ |m〉B|φ˜m〉
B′E
, where
|φ˜m〉
B′E
=
1√
S
∑
s
|s〉B′1 |φums〉B
′
2E .
Observe that φ˜Em ≈ θE ; by Uhlmann’s theorem their pu-
rifications are related as |φ˜m〉 ≈ (Vm ⊗ 1 )|φθ〉 for some
unitary operator Vm. Performing the controlled unitary
V =
∑
m |m〉〈m| ⊗ Vm on the system BB′ finally decou-
ples Eve, yielding
1√
M
∑
m
|m〉A ⊗ |m〉B|φθ〉B
′E
.
The above protocol may be modified into an entangle-
ment transmission one [4], in which case Alice encodes
a quantum state via
∑
m |ϕm〉〈m|. Hence our use of the
term “quantum code” for (|ϕm〉)m.
4Entanglement distillation (2.). We now turn to the
construction of a coherent version of the key distillation
protocol. To each classical set Cl corresponds a quantum
operator Λl =
∑
ms |ms〉〈ulms|. In lieu of a complete von
Neumann measurement on A, Alice performs a much less
intrusive one composed of the Λl (there is also a “failure”
outcome that happens with probability ≈ 0), revealing a
particular value of l which is communicated to Bob using
nH(X |B)+ bits. Their joint state becomes [16]
|Ψ〉ABE = 1√
M
∑
m
|ms〉A ⊗ 1√
S
∑
s
|φulms〉BE .
which differs from (4) only in that |m〉A is replaced by
|ms〉A. As before, Bob performs the coherent measure-
ment, resulting in the analogue of (5):
1√
MS
∑
ms
|ms〉A ⊗ |ms〉B|φulms〉B
′E
.
To dispose of Alice’s s-register in a coherent way fur-
ther classical communication is necessary. Alice per-
forms a measurement in the Fourier-transformed basis
|tˆ〉 = 1√
S
∑S
s=1 e
2piist/S |s〉 (t = 1, . . . , S), and commu-
nicates the result t to Bob using nI(X ;E)+ bits, who
then applies the phase shift
∑S
s=1 e
2piist/S |s〉〈s| to the s–
component of his B register. This yields precisely (5) and
the rest of the protocol follows the entanglement genera-
tion one above.
It is possible to make a more direct connection between
entanglement distillation and the quantum codes used
for entanglement generation. Observe that the quan-
tum code (3) could have equally well been substituted
by (|φltm〉)m for any t = 1, . . . , S, l = 1, . . . , L, where
|φltm〉 = 1√
S
∑
s
e2piist/S |φulms〉.
The sets (|φltm〉)tm and (|φulms〉)ms are (mutually unbi-
ased) bases for the same space Ql. The Ql are, in turn,
a covering of W⊗n(TA), W =
∑
x |φx〉〈x|, since the Cl
are a covering of TX . In other words, W
⊗n(TA) is cov-
ered by quantum codes in much the same way that TX
is covered by key generation codes. Our entanglement
distillation protocol may be viewed as Alice collapsing
her space onto some quantum code via a measurement,
sending I(A;E)+ bits of “which code” information to
Bob, and Bob decoding as in entanglement generation.
This view is very similar to the approach pursued by the
Horodeckis [14], the difference lying in our using “ran-
dom CSS codes” [8] rather than random subspace ones
[15, 20].
In conclusion, we have seen that all four scenarios al-
low an asymptotic conversion rate R = Ic(A〉B), the
latter referring to the state ρAB which is either given
(static case), or can be created by an application of the
channel (dynamic case). In fact, the optimal rates for
the coherent scenarios are also given in terms of Ic, but
applied to an appropriately blocked and preprocessed
state/channel [8, 10, 13]. The same is true for the private
scenarios with Ic(A〉B) replaced by the possibly larger
I(X ;A) − I(X ;B) [22]. It remains an open question
whether coherent (quantum) and private information are
fully equivalent within our model.
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